Are Juries Less Erratic than Individuals? Deliberation, Polarization, and Punitive Damages

Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform

A substantial recent literature has documented the inability of jurors to make sound decisions with respect to punitive damages, particularly for health, safety, and environmental torts. Included in this literature are experimental studies documenting the better performance of judges than jurors for the same case scenarios. Recent research by Eisenberg et al. (2002) has suggested, however, that...

Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages

An experimental study of punitive damage awards in personal injury cases was conducted, using jury-eligible respondents. There was substantial consensus on judgments of the outrageousness of a defendant’s actions and of the appropriate severity of punishment. Judgments of dollar awards made by individuals and synthetic juries were much more erratic. These results are familiar characteristics of...

Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm

Do Punitive Damages Promote Deterrence?

The paper explores the deterrent effect of punitive damages when capital investment is endogenous to the legal rule. Irrespective of the level of damages, firms can reduce their expected liabilities by either increasing safety (the law’s intended goal) or reducing wealth exposed to liability. We show that punitive damages can exacerbate this wealth reduction effect and thereby reduce deterrence...

Punitive Damages and Private Ordering Fetishism

Let me begin with some words of warm thanks, first to Professors Michael Krauss and David Owen for engaging my work with attention and interest and, second, to the editors at PENNumbra, for soliciting my reactions. This Reply’s principal goal is to clarify some areas in which I think Professors Krauss and Owen misunderstood some aspects of my proposed framework for restructuring punitive damage...