منابع مشابه
The College Admissions Problem Reconsidered
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BACKGROUND Research has shown that a number of patients, with a variety of diagnoses, are admitted to hospital when it is not essential and can remain in hospital unnecessarily. To date, research in this area has been primarily quantitative. The purpose of this study was to explore the perceived causes of inappropriate or prolonged lengths of stay and focuses on a specific population (i.e., pat...
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We develop the first Bayesian model of decentralized college admissions, with heterogeneous students, costly portfolio applications, and uncertainty about student calibers. Students face a nontrivial portfolio choice, and colleges choose admissions standards that act like market-clearing prices. We solve for the two college model equilibrium, deriving a “law of demand”. The lesser college impac...
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We consider the classic college admissions problem. Unlike Gale and Shapley (1962), we realistically assume that (i) students’ college application choices are nontrivial because applications are costly, and (ii) college rankings of students are noisy and thus uncertain at the time of application. We analyze a general equilibrium model where two ranked colleges set admissions standards for stude...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Psychiatric Bulletin
سال: 1999
ISSN: 0955-6036,1472-1473
DOI: 10.1192/pb.23.4.241