Are credit screening contracts designed for men?
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract Access to credit is key succeed in business. Theoretical models of under asymmetric information classify borrowers and grant or deny credit, typically based on incentive-compatible contracts with collateral. However, if women are particularly risk averse, female may be wrongly classified denied credit. We conduct three countries a laboratory experiment study this systematic gender difference. Results show that collateral fail disclose women’s private information, while disclosing men’s information. suggest banks should incorporate the difference attitudes avoid glass ceiling access
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Service Business
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1862-8508', '1862-8516']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11628-022-00485-w