Aquinas, Geach, and existence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Arguments for God’s Existence: Anselm and Aquinas
Imagine a God0 that had every attribute that a God1 has (omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, etc.) except existence. By premise two, having existence is better than not having it. So only God1, not God0, could be God according to Anselm’s definition. Several philosophers, including Descartes (1596–1650), followed Anselm in putting forth a variation of the argument. A contemporary of Anse...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1689-8311
DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v11i3.2837