Aptness and means-end coherence: a dominance argument for causal decision theory

Dominance-Based Decision Theory

Decision theory has been plagued with a variety of problems almost from the start. Some, like the Ellsberg paradox [Ellsberg, 1961] merely seem to point to the problems actual people have in calculating probabilities and utilities. Others, like the Newcomb paradox and its relatives, have motivated a re-foundation of decision theory on causal grounds rather than evidential grounds [Joyce, 1999]....

Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons

Intentions matter. They have some kind of normative impact on our agency. Something goes wrong when an agent intends some end and fails to carry out the means she believes to be necessary for it, and something goes right when, intending the end, she adopts the means she thinks are required. This has even been claimed to be one of the only uncontroversial truths in ethical theory. But not only i...

Comments on Causal Decision Theory

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Conditionals in causal decision theory

This paper explores the possibility that causal decision theory can be formulated in terms of probabilities of conditionals. It is argued that a generalized Stalnaker semantics in combination with an underlying branching time structure not only provides the basis for a plausible account of the semantics of indicative conditionals, but also that the resulting conditionals have properties that ma...

Causal Decision Theory and EPR correlations