Approximation Theorems for Zero-Sum Nonstationary Stochastic Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society
سال: 1984
ISSN: 0002-9939
DOI: 10.2307/2044849