Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematics of Operations Research
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0364-765X,1526-5471
DOI: 10.1287/moor.1090.0436