Approximately Truthful Mechanisms for Radio Spectrum Allocation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
TRADE: A truthful online combinatorial auction for spectrum allocation in cognitive radio networks
Auctions have been shown to be able to tackle the problem of spectrum scarcity effectively, but most of existing works only focus on static scenarios. They cannot deal with the requests of spectrum users as they arrive and leave dynamically. Bidders can either cheat by bidding untruthfully or cheat about the arrival and departure time. In this paper, we model the radio spectrum allocation probl...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0018-9545,1939-9359
DOI: 10.1109/tvt.2014.2345418