منابع مشابه
Approximately Efficient Online Mechanism Design
Online mechanism design (OMD) addresses the problem of sequential decision making in a stochastic environment with multiple self-interested agents. The goal in OMD is to make value-maximizing decisions despite this self-interest. In previous work we presented a Markov decision process (MDP)-based approach to OMD in large-scale problem domains. In practice the underlying MDP needed to solve OMD ...
متن کاملApproximately Optimal Teaching of Approximately Optimal Learners
We propose a method of generating teaching policies for use in intelligent tutoring systems (ITS) for concept learning tasks [37], e.g., teaching students the meanings of words by showing images that exemplify their meanings à la Rosetta Stone [30] and Duo Lingo [13]. The approach is grounded in control theory and capitalizes on recent work by [28], [29] that frames the “teaching” problem as th...
متن کاملApproximately Optimal Auctions
We show that auctions can generate near optimal total expected revenue by not using optimal reserve prices. Suppose we have n = 1 bidders in a posted-price, sealed-bid auction. This bidder has type v i drawn from distribution F. We can describe what the expected revenue is with a functionˆR : T → R: ˆ R(p) = p(1 − F(p)). (1) Figures 1 and 2 show expected revenue functions for the exponential di...
متن کاملTowards Approximately Optimal Poker
(www.aaai.org). All rights reserved. Creating strategies for different games forces us to grapple with different types of decision-making challenges. Poker is a stochastic game of imperfect information; unlike games of complete information, game-theoretic optimal strategies for poker can be randomized. Koller and Pfeffer [1] argue that two-player poker can be solved efficiently in the size of t...
متن کاملApproximately Optimal Auctions
While Myerson’s theorem provides an elegant solution to the optimal auction design problem for k-good auctions, his auction is rather complicated, and is consequently not widely used in practice. On the other hand, posted-price mechanisms are widely used in practice. We have derived an optimal posted-price mechanism for an auction with a single bidder.1 What about for multiple bidders? What is ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Annual Review of Economics
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1941-1383,1941-1391
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025607