Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Approximately Eicient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions
We develop and extend a line of recent work on the design of mechanisms for two-sided markets. e markets we consider consist of buyers and sellers of a number of items, and the aim of a mechanism is to improve the social welfare by arranging purchases and sales of the items. A mechanism is given prior distributions on the agents’ valuations of the items, but not the actual valuations; thus the...
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A well-known problem in combinatorial auctions (CAs) is that the value space grows exponentially in the number of goods, which often puts a large burden on the bidders and on the auctioneer. In this paper, we introduce a new design paradigm for CAs based on machine learning (ML). Bidders report their values (bids) to a proxy agent by answering a small number of value queries. The proxy agent th...
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This survey considers the following setting. A seller wants to sell a set of indivisible goods. A set of buyers are interested in buying the goods. Buyers have private values for bundles of goods they are interested in buying. The seller’s objective is to allocate the goods to the buyers efficiently (maximizing the total utility of buyers). Since the values of buyers are private information, th...
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Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require the solution of a diÆcult optimization problem. This is true of mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, which have in recent years assumed practical importance, and in particular of the gold standard for combinatorial auctions, the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA). Traditional analysis of these mechanisms i...
متن کاملTruth Revelation in Rapid, Approximately Eecient Combinatorial Auctions
Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require the solution of a diicult optimization problem. This is true of mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, which have in recent years assumed practical importance, and in particular of the gold standard for combinatorial auctions, the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA). Traditional analysis of these mechanisms-i...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2167-8375,2167-8383
DOI: 10.1145/3381523