Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Note on Approximate Revenue Maximization with Two Items
We consider the problem of maximizing revenue when selling 2 items to a single buyer with known valuation distributions. In [1], Hart and Nisan showed that selling each item separately using the optimal Myerson’s price, gains at least half of the revenue attainable by optimal auction for two items. We show that in case the items have different revenues when sold separately the bound can be tigh...
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Consider the revenue-maximizing problem in which a single seller wants to sell k different items to a single buyer, who has independently distributed values for the items with additive valuation. The k = 1 case was completely resolved by Myerson's classical work in 1981, whereas for larger k the problem has been the subject of much research efforts ever since. Recently, Hart and Nisan analyzed ...
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Setting prices for items is difficult because one needs to look at prices other substitutable as well as complimentary items. In a co-purchasing network, co-occurence of items can be exploited to tweak item prices for revenue maximization. In our report, we investigate the effects of co-occurrence of items on their prices. In general this problem seems to be NP-Hard. We propose heuristics based...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.09.001