Application of Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms Design Theory (Self-adjusting, Effective/Efficient Mechanisms) in the Seventh National Development Planning
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چکیده
Application of Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms Design Theory (Self-adjusting, Effective/Efficient Mechanisms) in the Seventh National Development Planning
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ?????????? ? ?????
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['2616-6798']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.52547/jpbud.27.3.141