Appearance and Explanation: Phenomenal Explanationism in Epistemology by Kevin McCain and Luca Moretti

Reviewed by: Appearance and Explanation: Phenomenal Explanationism in Epistemology by Kevin McCain Luca Moretti Caleb Estep McCAIN, Moretti. Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. iv + 195 pp. Cloth, $70.00 Since its beginning, phenomenal conservatism (PC) has grown rapidly popularity as a theory of epistemic justification. In Explanation, develop out PC new justification that they call explanationism (PE). Their goal is to integrate with explanationism—the view comes from the best explanation—thereby creating PE hybrid theory. They ambitiously contend captures same basic intuitions but better equipped handle phenomena whole, troubling objections (and foundationalism general), skeptical [End Page 354] arguments. The book comprised seven chapters. This review will emphasize first four. chapter 1, authors discuss what merits. idea "we should grant things be way appear [or seem] be, unless we have reason doubt" our seemings. point some benefits perceived followers: It "provide[s] widespread practices rationale," "it offers unified account non-inferential for beliefs very different types," constitutes basis fallible foundationalism," strong "antiskeptical bite." 2, argue not sufficient even noninferential First, argue, gives an insufficient explanation no-defeater condition. condition "unless clause built into PC. does explain why or how S's doubt "interacts seeming e such diminish believing p." Second, if power seemings justify themselves, then become unstable once subject becomes aware them. upshot this are justification, justified would 3, begin elaborate on their view. distinguish between mere seemings, paired appearances, presentational appearances show can varying degrees justificatory power. Seemings used roughly synonymous way. Mere lacking both sensations phenomenology, hence provide weak form Paired phenomenology. greater strength than less appearances. Presentational produce strongest include big payoff these distinctions strengths 4, outline version explanationism, which evidentialist character. follows: "Believing p S at t only t: (1). total evidence, E; (2). either (i) (sufficiently good) (where subset E), (ii) explanatory consequence relevant p's truth significantly it ~ truth); (3). case fails satisfy respect because additional evidence included E." 355] Next, merge understood through threefold division given 3. result necessary proposition evidence. Appearances contribute regulate capacity...