منابع مشابه
Temporal characteristics in apparent movement: omega movement vs. phi movement.
A vertical line stimulus was presented alternately at two positions on an oscilloscope face, with no interstimulus interval. Observation of this stimulus produced haphazard alternation between a number of movement percepts, which were divided into four categories: phi, omega and partial movement, and no movement. Attention to one category did not increase the proportion of time movement in that...
متن کاملVisual transformations underlying apparent movement.
Apparent movement of a rigid object is seen when two different views of the same object are separated by relatively long distances and times. In a series of experiments, the minimum stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) required for the apparent form-preserving movement of an object was recorded. In Experiment I, an object was alternately displayed in two positions obtained by displacing and rotating...
متن کاملApparent Object Movement Produced by Head Movement under Water
It was predicted that due to the optical distortion produced.by wearing a facemask, the constancy of visual position would not be maintained under water, i. e., stationary objects should appear to move when the head is moved. Subjects made magnitude estimates of object movement in both air and water. Twice as much movement occurred in water as in air. Two underwater activities, head rotation wh...
متن کاملVelocity constraints on apparent rotational movement.
The visual illusion of apparent rigid rotation was produced by sequential alternation of two views of the same object in different orientations. The minimum stimulus-onset asynchrony required for the appearance of rigid rotation was a linearly increasing function of the angular difference in orientation between the two views. Variation in the size of the object affected the zero-intercept of th...
متن کاملPhenomenal Space and the Unity of Conscious Experience
One's contemporaneous conscious mental states seem bound in a single, unified experience. Dainton argues, against what he calls the S-Thesis, that we cannot explain such co-consciousness in terms of states' being located in a single phenomenal space, a functional space posited to explain our ability to locate ourselves relative to perceived stimuli. But Dainton's argument rests on a conflation ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Perception & Psychophysics
سال: 1983
ISSN: 0031-5117,1532-5962
DOI: 10.3758/bf03202862