ANTITRUST IMMUNITY FOR AIRLINE ALLIANCES

Container Liner Shipping Alliances, Excess Investment, and Antitrust Immunity

Introducing the unique characteristics of the international marine transport industry, this paper examines whether load capacity is excessive or insufficient in the presence of uncertainty on the future economic situation in terms of both welfare of one country and global welfare. We also consider the effect of alliances and the application of antitrust immunity on capacity building of shipping...

Revenue Sharing in Airline Alliances

W propose a two-stage game-theoretic approach to study the operations of an airline alliance in which independent carriers, managing different reservation and information systems, can collaboratively market and operate codeshare and interline itineraries. In the first-stage game, airlines negotiate fixed proration rates to share the revenues generated by such itineraries. In the second-stage ga...

EC competition law and airline alliances

The EC Commission has examined a number of airline alliances under EC competition law. Its general approach is to identify the relevant market(s), to assess the likely effect on competition in those markets and then to propose remedies/conditions. Remedies generally include those: concerning operations on the route(s); allowing competitors access to certain facilities; involving undertakings by...

Dynamic Revenue Management in Airline Alliances

Major airlines are selling increasing numbers of interline itineraries, in which flights operated by two or more airlines are combined and sold together. One reason for this increase is the rapid growth of airline alliances, which promote the purchase of interline itineraries and therefore virtually extend the reach of each alliance member’s network. This practice, however, creates a difficult ...

Decentralized Code-Share Revenue Management in Airline Alliances