Anticompetitive Overbuying by Power Buyers

Buyers' alliances for bargaining power

Buyers’ Alliances for Bargaining Power by Suchan Chae and Paul Heidhues We provide a novel explanation as to why forming an alliance of buyers (or sellers) across separate markets can be advantageous when input prices are determined by bargaining. Our explanation helps to understand the prevalence of buyer cooperatives among small and medium sized firms.

Measuring Anticompetitive Effects of Mergers When Buyer Power Is Concentrated

summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, 1976, Purdue University; M.S. (Mathematics), 1978, Purdue University; M.S. (Economics), 1978, Purdue University; Ph.D. (Economics), 1980, Purdue University. **Professor of Economics, University of British Columbia. B.A. (Economics), 1977, University of British Columbia; M.A. (Economics), 1977, University of British Columbia; Ph.D. (Economics), 1982, University o...

Are Exclusive Contracts Anticompetitive?

While antitrust law is often hostile to exclusive contracts that say ”you agree not to purchase this product from anyone besides me”, economic theory so far has provided only partial support for such a hostility.1 This paper shows that this hostility can be justified under more general circumstances than has been established so far in the literature: a firm may introduce exclusivity clauses in ...

Is Vertical Integration Anticompetitive?

Anticompetitive Patent Injunctions