Anticipating Disagreement in Dynamic Contracting
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract This paper studies how anticipated disagreement between a financier and an entrepreneur affects optimal contracting asset prices. The value of debt is uniquely immune to disagreement, when the set disagreements sufficiently rich, this immunity causes contract give debt. In contrast, values other contracts, including equity, decline as becomes more severe. suggests channel through which increase in severity increases equity premium debt-to-equity ratio.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Finance
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1875-824X', '1572-3097']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfac007