منابع مشابه
Anonymous Single-profile Welfarism
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متن کاملMulti_profile welfarism: a generalization
This paper characterizes welfarist social evaluation in a multi-profile setting where, in addition to multiple utility profiles, there may be more than one profile of nonwelfare information. We prove a new version of the welfarism theorem in this alternative framework, and we demonstrate that adding a plausible and weak anonymity property to the welfarism axioms generates welfarist social-evalu...
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In a single framework, I address the question of the informational basis for evaluating social states. I particularly focus on information about individual welfare, individual preferences and individual (moral) judgments, but the model is also open to any other informational input deemed relevant, e.g. sources of welfare and motivations behind preferences. In addition to proving some possibilit...
متن کاملRelative Nash Welfarism
Relative Nash welfarism is a solution to the problem of aggregating von NeumannMorgenstern preferences over a set of lotteries. It ranks such lotteries according to the product of any collection of 0—normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities they generate. We show that this criterion is characterized by the Weak Pareto Principle, Anonymity, and Independence of Harmless Expansions: the social...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0131-1