Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited
نویسندگان
چکیده
We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in single-valued social choice. first analyze irresoluteness outlook these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on choice rules deliver a method to refine irresolute without violating anonymity, neutrality, efficiency. Next, we propose weakening called consequential that requires resolute assign each alternative same number profiles. explore problems which resolves impossibilities stem from fundamental tension between resoluteness.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0176-1714', '1432-217X']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01308-5