Analyzing factors distinguishing e-buyers from brick and mortar buyers
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
APPENDIX A ANALYZING District-D WITH UNIT-DEMAND BUYERS
In this section, we extend Myerson’s revenue characterization theorem to double auctions and show that Algorithm 2 is bid monotonic while Algorithm 4 returns the critical submission for every winning seller. We start by proving Lemma 2. Proof to Lemma 2: We use the following notation for convenience. Given v, let v −m = (a1, . . . , am−1, am+1, . . . , aM , b1, . . . , bN ) be the vector where ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Internet Applications and Management
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1309-8810
DOI: 10.5505/iuyd.2016.37450