Analyst Reputation, Communication and Information Acquisition
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics
We study reputation games where a long-lived player with a possible commitment type faces a sequence of short-lived players who must pay to observe the long-lived players past behavior. In this costly information model we show that equilibrium behavior is cyclical. The long-lived player builds her reputation up only to exploit it; then builds it up again, and so on. We call this behavior reput...
متن کاملInformation and Communication Technology Reputation for XU030 Quote Companies
—By the increasing spread of information technology and Internet improvements, most of the large-scale companies are paying special attention to their reputation on many types of the information and communication technology. The increasing developments and penetration of new technologies into daily life, brings out paradigm shift on the perception of reputation and creates new concepts like e-s...
متن کاملAnalyst coverage and acquisition returns: Evidence from natural experiments
Takeover target firms covered by more equity analysts are sold for higher premiums while their acquirers earn lower merger announcement returns. We confirm these results using exogenous shocks to coverage arising from brokerage-house mergers or closures (i.e., quasi-natural experiments) as instruments for the loss of analyst coverage. In general, our findings indicate that target coverage by eq...
متن کاملAnalyst Effort Allocation and Firms ’ Information Environment
We examine how sell-side analysts allocate their effort among firms in their research portfolios and the consequences of their effort allocation decisions. We show that analysts play favorites among portfolio firms by devoting more effort to firms that are relatively more important for their career concerns. Specifically, controlling for analyst and firm characteristics, we find that within eac...
متن کاملReputation and Imperfect Information
A common observation in the informal literature of economics (and elsewhere) is that in multistage “games,” players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being “tough” or “benevolent” or something else. But this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game-theoretic analyses of finite games, such as Selten’s finitely repeated chain-store game or in the finitely repeated priso...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2524536