Analysis of Asymmetric Two-Sided Matching: Agent-Based Simulation with Theorem-Proof Approach
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Designing a Two-Sided Matching Protocol under Asymmetric Information
We have developed a new two-sided matching protocol including job applicants and employers in the condition that applicants have conditional preferences and well informed applicants exist. In past research, two-sided matching has covered some assignment problems such as residency matching. However, in the case of matching on the information network, different applicants are differently informed...
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Most of the two-sided matching literature maintains the assumption that agents are never indifferent between any two members of the opposite side. In practice, however, ties in preferences arise naturally and are widespread. Market design needs to handle ties carefully, because in the presence of indifferences, stability no longer implies Pareto efficiency, and the deferred acceptance algorithm...
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In two-sided matching problem, there are overwhelming evidences that support peoples are also motivated by concerns for fairness and reciprocity. We will show that compromise which is individually irrational improves the welfare of the whole groups. The reasonable compromise level is obtained as the function of the size of the group so that the social utility should be maximized.
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In this demo, we present the implementation of a novel Agent-based Modelling and Simulation approach for the Schema Matching problem called “Schema Matching Agent-based Simulation” (SMAS). Our solution aims at generating high quality schema matchings with minimum uncertainty. As far as we know, there is no previous literature describing a solution approaching the Automatic Schema Matching and M...
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This note introduces and studies two-sided matching with incomplete information and common values. An impossibility result shows that even with full information about one side’s values, there exists no detail-free stable incentive compatible matching mechanism.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1460-7425
DOI: 10.18564/jasss.2232