Analysing multiparty competition in plurality rule elections
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Analysing multiparty competition in plurality rule elections
The study of general election outcomes can be helped by finding better approaches for visualizing large quantities of information and asking questions about its patterning. We review the Nagayama or ‘all possibilities’ triangle display, and show that it can only legitimately be used to show an overall ‘field’ of results that is logically feasible, called the effective space of competition, whic...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Party Politics
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1354-0688,1460-3683
DOI: 10.1177/1354068811411026