Analogue Man - Engagement Without Commitment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Mechanism design without commitment ∗ , †
This paper identifies mechanisms that are implementable even when the planner cannot commit to the rules of the mechanism. The standard approach is to require mechanism to be robust against redesign. This often leads nonexistence of acceptable mechanisms. The novelty of this paper to require robustness against redesigns that are themselves robust against redesigns that are themselves robust aga...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Canadian Journal of Communication
سال: 1979
ISSN: 1499-6642,0705-3657
DOI: 10.22230/cjc.1979v6n1a224