An Uncertainty-and Collusion-Proof Voting Consensus Mechanism in Blockchain

Though voting-based consensus algorithms in blockchain outperform proof-based ones energy-and transaction-efficiency, they are prone to incur wrong elections and bribery elections. The former originates from the uncertainties of candidates’ capability availability, latter comes egoism voters candidates. Hence, this paper, we propose an uncertainty-and collusion-proof voting mechanism, including selection pressure-based algorithm trustworthiness evaluation algorithm. first can decrease side effects uncertainties, lowering while trading off balance between efficiency fairness miners. second adopts incentive-compatible scoring rule evaluate voting, motivating report true beliefs on candidates by making consistent with altruism so as avoid A salient feature our work is theoretically analyzing proposed mechanism large deviation theory. Our analysis provides not only failure rate a candidate but also its decay speed. measures incompetence any personal perspective based which concepts the effective valve expectation merit introduced help system designer determine optimal standard guide behave way for rate.