An Ordinal Bargaining Solution with Fixed-Point Property

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An Ordinal Bargaining Solution with Fixed-Point Property

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

سال: 2008

ISSN: 1076-9757

DOI: 10.1613/jair.2656