An optimal time incentive/disincentive -based compensation in contracts with multiple agents
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal compensation contracts when managers can hedge
This paper examines optimal compensation contracts when executives can hedge their personal portfolios. In a simple principal-agent framework, I predict that the Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO’s) pay-performance sensitivity decreases with the executivehedging cost. Empirically, I find evidence supporting the model’s prediction. Providing further support for the theory, I show that shareholders ...
متن کاملOptimal Compensation Contracts with Pay-for- Performance and Termination Incentives
This paper studies optimal compensation contracts in the presence of both payfor-performance and termination incentives. While these incentives have been studied independently, this paper’s model is the first to incorporate both. The primary result is that pay-for-performance and the threat of termination are substitute incentive devices; holding effort constant, optimal pay-for-performance inc...
متن کاملOptimal Contracts in Continuous-time Models
We present a unified approach to solving contracting problems with full information in models driven by Brownian motion. We apply the stochastic maximum principle to give necessary and sufficient conditions for contracts that implement the so-called first-best solution. The optimal contract is proportional to the difference between the underlying process controlled by the agent and a stochastic...
متن کاملoptimal joint survival probability of xl reinsurance contracts in iran insurance company
اگر تنها یک صنعت جهت حفظ تعادل در بازار جهانی ضروری باشد، می توان ادعا نمود که آن صنعت بیمه است. صنعت بیمه بدون کمک صنعت بیمه اتکایی قادر به انجام وظیفه خویش نخواهد بود. اکثر تحقیقات انجام گرفته در زمینه بیمه اتکایی تنها با در نظر گرفتن منافع شرکت بیمه شده بوده است و منافع شرکت بیمه گر اتکایی کمتر مورد توجه بوده است. در این رساله با در نظر گرفتن منافع همزمان هر دو شرکت بیمه گذار اصلی و بیمه گر ...
15 صفحه اولManaging Time-Based Contracts with Delayed Payments
Some manufacturers impose a time-based contract on their suppliers under which each supplier is paid only when all of the suppliers have completed their tasks. We investigate whether or not the manufacturer ought to demand such a delayed payment contract. In our model with one manufacturer and two suppliers, we compare the impact of both a delayed payment regime and a no delayed payment regime ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Construction Economics and Building
سال: 2016
ISSN: 2204-9029
DOI: 10.5130/ajceb.v16i4.4983