An Optimal Strategy for Determining True Bidding Values in Secure Spectrum Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Systems Journal
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1932-8184,1937-9234,2373-7816
DOI: 10.1109/jsyst.2018.2829833