An LP Approach for Solving Two-Player Zero-Sum Repeated Bayesian Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Solving Two-Player Zero-Sum Repeated Bayesian Games
This paper studies two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian games in which every player has a private type that is unknown to the other player, and the initial probability of the type of every player is publicly known. The types of players are independently chosen according to the initial probabilities, and are kept the same all through the game. At every stage, players simultaneously choose actio...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0018-9286,1558-2523,2334-3303
DOI: 10.1109/tac.2018.2885644