An informational model for two-person games

A Buddhist Model for the Informational Person

A Buddhist theory of information comports with the recent notion of information ethics wherein information may be included within skillful means (upāya). Buddhists reject epistemological-ontological dualism: the conceptual and the non-conceptual are not distinct sources of knowledge. The act of cognition and the cognized object are momentary-together. Any category including information as a sub...

A TRANSITION FROM TWO-PERSON ZERO-SUM GAMES TO COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH FUZZY PAYOFFS

In this paper, we deal with games with fuzzy payoffs. We proved that players who are playing a zero-sum game with fuzzy payoffs against Nature are able to increase their joint payoff, and hence their individual payoffs by cooperating. It is shown that, a cooperative game with the fuzzy characteristic function can be constructed via the optimal game values of the zero-sum games with fuzzy payoff...

Computing Equilibria for Two-person Games

Computing Equilibria for Two-Person Games

This paper is a self-contained survey of algorithms for computing Nash equilibria of two-person games given in normal form or extensive form. The classical Lemke{Howson algorithm for nding one equilibrium of a bimatrix game is presented graph-theoretically as well as algebraically in terms of complementary pivoting. Common deenitions of degenerate games are shown as equivalent. Enumeration of a...

A symmetrization for finite two-person games

The symmetrization method of Gale, Kuhn and Tucker for matrix games is extended for bimatrix games. It is shown that the equilibria of a bimatrix game and its symmetrization correspond two by two. A similar result is found with respect to quasi-strong, regular and perfect equilibria.