An Incentive-Compatible Mechanism for Decentralized Storage Network

نویسندگان

چکیده

The dominance of a few big companies in the storage market arising various concerns including single point failure, privacy violation, and oligopoly. To eliminate dependency on such centralized architecture, several Decentralized Storage Network (DSN) schemes as Filecoin, Sia, Storj have been introduced. DSNs leverage blockchain technology to create platform that micro providers can also participate market. verify accurate data by during contract, apply Proof (PoS) scheme continuously inspect service. However, continuous verification provider imposes an extra cost network therefore end-users. Moreover, DSN's PoS is vulnerable service denying attack which submits valid while client. Considering benefits existing challenges DSNs, this paper introduces novel incentive-compatible DSN scheme. In scheme, conducted only if client challenge request. We model repeated dynamic game set players' payoffs provider's dominant strategy honestly follow contract. Our proposed mechanism leverages smart-contract oracle govern agreement between efficiently. Furthermore, our independent specific but be plugged into any with execution capability. As proof concept, we implemented using solidity language chainlink network. performance analysis demonstrates applicability

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering

سال: 2023

ISSN: ['2334-329X', '2327-4697']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/tnse.2023.3245326