An improved welfare guarantee for first-price auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
An Improved Welfare Guarantee for First Price Auctions
This paper proves that the welfare of the first price auction in Bayes-Nash equilibrium is at least a .743-fraction of the welfare of the optimal mechanism assuming agents’ values are independently distributed. The previous best bound was 1 − 1/e ≈ .63, derived in Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013) using smoothness, the standard technique for reasoning about welfare of games in equilibrium. In the wor...
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We study a model of two-round, rst-price, sealed bid auctions with two bidders and two identical items. We assume that both bidders want to purchase both items and the bidders valuation for the object remains the same in both rounds. After the conclusion of the rst round, the winner and the winning bid are publicly announced. The bidders use this information to update their beliefs about the...
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We propose a new approach to asymmetric rst price auctions which circumvents having to directly examine bidding strategies. Speci cally, the ratio of bidderspayo¤s is compared to the ratio of the distribution functions that describe beliefs. This comparison allows a number of easy inferences. In the existing theoretical literature, assumptions of rst order stochastic dominance or stronger im...
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We study markets in which an auctioneer wishes to assemble a team of agents to accomplish some task. These agents offer fixed services that incur some privately known cost. The auctioneer must select a team, or feasible set of agents, that is capable of performing the task. To this end, he designs a procurement auction in which he solicits bids from the agents and then selects some feasible set...
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I study a symmetric first-price auction prior to which one designated player can offer his rival a bribe in exchange for the latter’s departure from the auction. I consider Essentially Prefect Bayesian Equilibria (EPBE) of this game in which the bribing function is weakly increasing (EPBE is a superclass of PBE). I prove that every continuous such equilibrium (i.e., a one in which the bribing f...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ACM SIGecom Exchanges
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1551-9031
DOI: 10.1145/3331033.3331040