An illiberal economic order: commitment mechanisms become tools of authoritarian coercion
نویسندگان
چکیده
Globalization did not negate state power. It changed the toolkit. We expected norms and incentives of liberal economic order to push regimes in places like China Russia democratize. Instead, authoritarianism appears be thriving. This article argues that authoritarians have learned how take advantage institutions underpinning globalization for their own illiberal ends. They use courts major powers effects international target political competition. subvert our expectations by repurposing basic premises liberalism – predictability openness. The demonstrates these claims examining multiple regimes, which were designed as constraints, been turned into offensive tools. findings illustrate International Political Economy (IPE) scholars need begin analyzing governments tactics whether we can reconcile contradictions they exploit.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of International Political Economy
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['1466-4526', '0969-2290']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2023.2211280