An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 1995
ISSN: 0012-9682
DOI: 10.2307/2171726