An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Costly Concessions: an Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility
We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework allows us to characterize matching equilibrium in a flexible way that includes as special cases the classical fullyand non-transferable utility models, collective models, and settings with taxes on transfers. We allow for the introduction of a ge...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2535394