An Emergency Quantity Discount Contract with Supplier Risk Aversion under the Asymmetric Information of Sales Costs

In the circumstance that unexpected events lead to information asymmetry of sales costs, supplier risk aversion and stochastic price, this paper discusses internal law using an emergency quantity discount contract coordinate supply chain. First, Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) model under condition symmetry is constructed. addition, extended game CVaR asymmetric costs solved. After that, simulation test performed. The results show firstly, random leads phenomenon bifurcation mutation in each decision variable chain system. Secondly, retailers can obtain excess profits by concealing private information, but harms interests suppliers entire Thirdly, with different attitudes should have strategies concerning cost information. Fourthly, more for unstable conclusion result coupling effect price randomness aversion. cannot region, outside it. Hiding benefits those who own it, system as a whole.