An efficient quantum meet-in-the-middle attack against NTRU-2005
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Reduced Memory Meet-in-the-Middle Attack against the NTRU Private Key
NTRU is a public-key cryptosystem introduced at ANTS-III. The two most used techniques in attacking the NTRU private key are meet-in-the-middle attacks and lattice-basis reduction attacks. Howgrave-Graham combined both techniques in 2007 and pointed out that the largest obstacle to attacks is the memory capacity that is required for the meet-in-the-middle phase. In the present paper an algorith...
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To date the NTRUEncrypt security parameters have been based on the existence of two types of attack: a meet-in-the-middle attack due to Odlyzko, and a conservative extrapolation of the running times of the best (known) lattice reduction schemes to recover the private key. We show that there is in fact a continuum of more efficient attacks between these two attacks. We show that by combining lat...
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Authentication with recently proposed quantum password protocol is secure against impersonation. Here we show that original version of the protocol is not secure against active malicious prover and verifier, however a slight modification provides a possibility for a legitimate party to detect the attacks. The password is reusable in the absence of the attacks. Otherwise the security of the auth...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Chinese Science Bulletin
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1001-6538,1861-9541
DOI: 10.1007/s11434-013-6020-y