An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders
An auctioneer wishes to sell several heterogeneous indivisible items to a group of potential bidders. Each bidder has valuations over the items but may face a budget constraint and therefore be unable to pay up to his values. In such markets, a Walrasian equilibrium may fail to exist. We develop a novel dynamic auction and prove that the auction always finds a core allocation. In the auction pr...
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A number of heterogeneous items are to be sold to a group of potential bidders. Every bidder knows his own values over the items and his own budget privately. Due to budget constraint, bidders may not be able to pay up to their values. In such a market, a Walrasian equilibrium typically fails to exist and also the existing auctions usually do not work properly anymore. To deal with such markets...
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Consider an auction for a divisible good where bidders have private budgets. Recent work by Dobzinski, Lavi, and Nisan (2012) shows there is no individually rational dominant strategy mechanism that implements a Pareto efficient outcome and satisfies weak budget balance when bidders have private budgets. My main result shows that when bidders have full-support beliefs over their rivals’ types, ...
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A seller with two objects faces a group of bidders who are subject to budget constraints. The objects have common values to all bidders, but need not be identical and may be either complements or substitutes. In a simple complete information setting we show: (1) if the objects are sold by means of a sequence of open ascending auctions, then it is always optimal to sell the more valuable object ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1918936