An Average-case Budget-Non-Negative Double Auction Protocol.
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence
سال: 2003
ISSN: 1346-0714,1346-8030
DOI: 10.1527/tjsai.18.15