An auction based task dispatching and pricing mechanism in bike-sharing

As an economical, low-carbon and convenient travel model, bike-sharing has become common in many cities around the world. However, daily usage of shared bikes results dispatching problem, i.e., to specific destinations satisfy riding demands. The platform can hire riders as workers pay incentivize them accomplish tasks. there exist multiple competing for tasks, they may strategically report their task accomplishing costs (which are usually private information only known by themselves) order make more profits, which result inefficient results. In this paper, we first design a algorithm named GDY-MAX allocate tasks workers, achieve good performance. it cannot prevent misreporting costs. Regarding issue, further strategy proof mechanism under budget constraint, consists worker pricing algorithm. We theoretically prove that our incentive compatibility, individual rationality, constraint constant approximation ratio. Furthermore, run extensive experiments evaluate based on Mobike dataset. show performance proposed is similar optimal terms coverage ratio accomplished regions sum region value, better than uniform total payment unit cost value.