An argument against causal decision theory
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract This paper develops an argument against causal decision theory. I formulate a principle of preference, which call the Guaranteed Principle. argue that preferences rational agents satisfy Principle, who embody theory do not, and hence is false.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Analysis
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0174-4747', '2196-6753']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaa037