An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information

An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information

We give a partial folk theorem for approximate equilibria of a class of discounted repeated games where each player receives a private signal of the play of his opponents . Our condition is that the game be "informationally connected," meaning that each player i has a deviation that can be statistically detected by player j regardless of the action of any third player k. Under the same conditio...

The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time

Folk theorems constitute a set of key results in the theory of discrete-time repeated games. These theorems state that the set of equilibrium payoffs expands to the set of all feasible and individually rational payoffs V∗ as players are increasingly patient. A central requirement for the standard folk theorem to hold is that profitable deviations from strategy profiles can be detected. Clearly,...

A Folk Theorem with Private Strategies

In this paper I prove a Folk theorem with T -private communication equilibria with an imperfect monitoring structure that may be public, private, and conditionally dependent or independent. I show that an efficient outcome is approachable as players become patient if every disobedience from efficiency is detectable by some player and some not necessarily efficient action profile. I also show th...

How Robust is the Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring?∗

In this paper, we prove that, under full rank, every perfect public equilibrium payoff (above some Nash equilibrium in the two-player case, and above the minmax payoff with more players) can be achieved with strategies that have bounded memory. This result is then used to prove that feasible, individually rational payoffs (above some strict Nash equilibrium in the two-player case, and above the...

Supplement to “ The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time ”