منابع مشابه
Ambiguous act equilibria
A novel approach for the study of games with strategic uncertainty is proposed. Games are defined such that players’ strategy spaces do nor only contain pure and mixed strategies but also contain “ambiguous act strategies”, in the sense that players can base their choices on subjective randomization devices. The notions of “independent strategies” as well as “common priors” are relaxed in such ...
متن کاملRadner Equilibria under Ambiguous Volatility
The present paper considers a class of general equilibrium economies when the primitive uncertainty model features uncertainty about continuous-time volatility. This requires a set of mutually singular priors, which do not share the same null sets. For this setting we introduce an appropriate commodity space and the dual of linear and continuous price systems. All agents in the economy are hete...
متن کاملBeliefs Correspondences and Equilibria in Ambiguous Games1
The Nash equilibrium concept combines two fundamental ideas. First, rational players choose the most preferred strategy given their beliefs about what other players will do. Second, it imposes the consistency condition that all players’ beliefs are correct. This consistency condition has often been considered too strong and different solution concepts have been introduced in the literature in o...
متن کاملVariational preferences and equilibria in games under ambiguous belief correspondences
In previous papers we studied a game model in which players' uncertainty is expressed entirely in the space of probabilities (lotteries) over consequences, it depends on the entire strategy profile chosen by the agents and it is described by the so called ambiguous beliefs correspondences. In this paper, we extend the previous results by embodying variational preferences in the model. We give a...
متن کاملA limit theorem for equilibria under ambiguous belief correspondences
Previous literature shows that, in many different models, limits of equilibria of perturbed games are equilibria of the unperturbed game when the sequence of perturbed games converges to the unperturbed one in an appropriate sense. The question whether such limit property extends to the equilibrium notions in ambiguous games is not yet clear as it seems; in fact, previous literature shows that ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1586771