منابع مشابه
Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition*
Many have observed that political candidates running for election are often purposefully expressing themselves in vague and ambiguous terms. In this paper we provide a simple formal model of this phenomenon. We model the electoral competition between two candidates as a two-stage game. In the first stage of the game two candidates simultaneously choose their ideologies, and in the second stage ...
متن کاملPandering and electoral competition
We study an election with two perfectly informed candidates. Voters share common values over the policy outcome of the election, but possess arbitrarily little information about which policy is best for them. Voters elect one of the candidates, effectively choosing between the two policies proposed by the candidates. We explore under which conditions candidates always propose the voters’ optima...
متن کاملHiding information in electoral competition
We model a two-candidate electoral competition in which there is uncertainty about a policy-relevant state of the world. The candidates receive private signals about the true state, which are imperfectly correlated. We study whether the candidates are able to credibly communicate their information to voters through their choice of policy platforms. Our results show that the fact that private in...
متن کاملRepeated Downsian electoral competition
We analyze an infinitely repeated version of the Downsian model of elections. The folk theorem suggests that a wide range of policy paths can be supported by subgame perfect equilibria when parties and voters are sufficiently patient. We go beyond this result by giving separate weak conditions on the patience of voters and the patience of parties under which every policy path can be supported. ...
متن کاملSignaling Character in Electoral Competition
We study a one-dimensional Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the following innovation: a fraction of candidates have “character” and are exogenously committed to a campaign platform; this is unobservable to voters. Character is desirable, and a voter’s utility is a convex combination of standard policy preferences and her assessment of a candidate’s character. This structure i...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics of Governance
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1435-6104,1435-8131
DOI: 10.1007/s10101-005-0003-7