منابع مشابه
Ambiguity vs risk: An experimental study of overconfidence, gender and trading activity
In this paper, we investigate the effect of overconfidence and gender on trading activity in experimental asset markets under a symmetric information setting. We measure the degree of overconfidence in three forms—miscalibration, a better-than-average effect, and the illusion of control, and design two treatments (Ambiguity and Risk) that differ by the prior information available about the dist...
متن کاملOverconfidence and diversification
Experimental evidence suggests that people tend to be overcon dent in the sense that they overestimate the accuracy of their private information. In this paper we show that risk-averse principals might prefer overcon dent agents in various strategic interactions because these agents help diversify the aggregate risk. This may help understanding why successful analysts and entrepreneurs tend to ...
متن کاملOverconfidence and Career Choice
People self-assess their relative ability when making career choices. Thus, confidence in their own abilities is likely an important factor for selection into various career paths. In a sample of 711 first-year students we examine whether there are systematic differences in confidence levels across fields of study. We find that our experimental confidence measures significantly vary between fie...
متن کاملOverconfidence and Informational Cascades∗
This paper combines behavioral economics and social learning. Overconfident agents overweigh their private information relative to the public information revealed by the decisions of others. Therefore, when following a herd, they broadcast more of the information available to them. However, overconfidence trades the additional information revealed by overconfident decisions against more informa...
متن کاملOverconfidence, Insurance and Paternalism
It is well known that when agents are fully rational, compulsory public insurance may make all agents better o¤ in the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model of insurance markets. We nd that when su¢ ciently many agents underestimate their personal risks, compulsory insurance makes low-risk agents worse o¤. Hence, behavioral biases may weaken some of the well-established rationales for governmen...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1773663