منابع مشابه
The optimal allocation of alternative collateral assets between different loans
This paper studies loan collateral and relationship banking. A firm has different loans (e.g. short-term and long-term loans) and alternative collateral assets. How does it allocate the collateral assets between the loans? It optimally secures a long-term loan with collateral that incurs high information costs initially and has a strong learning effect during the loan period (e.g. accounts rece...
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I study the implications of various bankruptcy regimes for student loans on college investment, human capital accumulation, and earnings in a heterogeneous life-cycle economy with risky human capital investment. The option to discharge one’s debt under a liquidation regime helps alleviate some of the risk of investing in human capital. However, dischargeability triggers exclusion from borrowing...
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I consider the implications of alternative bankruptcy regimes for student loans in a heterogeneous model of life-cycle earnings and risky human capital accumulation. Findings suggest that the ability level of high-school graduates drives the decision to enroll in college, while the initial human capital level is crucial for completing college. Also, the correlation between parental wealth and a...
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Since 80s, along with the heating-up competition in finance industry and the liberalization trend of financial supervision, a tendency of integration appears in world three financial service fields, namely banking, insurance, and security. It threats the banking business. The banking industry that always possesses the core position in financial system faces enormous challenges. On the other han...
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We analyze lending contracts when social sanctions are used to enforce repayments and borrowers di¤er in their unobserved sanctioning abilities. Symmetric group loans are preferred to cosigned loans when borrowers are relatively equal, and cosigned loans are preferred when borrowers are unequal. This explains why microlenders that target the poor (e.g., the Grameen Bank) use symmetric group loa...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Nature
سال: 1990
ISSN: 0028-0836,1476-4687
DOI: 10.1038/343584b0