Alternating-offer bargaining with endogenous commitment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Alternating Offer Bargaining with Endogenous Information*
Two ex ante identically informed agents play an alternating offer bargaining game with endogenous information acquisition and common values. This paper shows that perfect Bayesian equilibria may have the following properties. (i) No agreement exists in ultimatum bargaining although both agents maintain symmetric information in equilibrium and the gain from trade is common knowledge. (ii) The ag...
متن کاملCommitment in alternating offers bargaining
We extend the Ståhl-Rubinstein alternating-o¤er bargaining procedure to allow players, prior to each bargaining round, to simultaneously and visibly commit to some share of the pie. If commitment costs are small but increasing in the committed share, then the unique outcome consistent with common belief in future rationality (Perea, 2009), or more restrictively subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,...
متن کاملBounded Rationality and Alternating-Offer Bargaining
One form of bounded rationality is a breakdown in the commonality of the knowledge that the players are rational. In Rubinstein’s two-person alternating-offer bargaining game, assuming time preferences with constant discount factors, common knowledge of rationality is necessary for an agreement on a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) partition to be reached (if ever). In this note, assuming time...
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We extend the Ståhl-Rubinstein alternating-o¤er bargaining procedure to allow players, prior to each bargaining round, to simultaneously and visibly commit to some share of the pie. If commitment costs are small but increasing in the committed share, then the unique outcome consistent with common belief in future rationality (Perea, 2010), or more restrictively subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,...
متن کاملEnvy can promote more equal division in alternating-offer bargaining
Bargainers in an open-ended alternating-offer bargaining situation may perceive envy, a utility loss caused by receiving the smaller share that is modeled in some social preferences in addition to self-interest. I extend Rubinstein (1982)’s original solution of the bargaining problem for two self-interested bargainers to this strategic situation. Bargainers still reach agreement in the first pe...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109247