Allocation of Prizes in Contests with Participation Constraints
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1058-6407
DOI: 10.1111/jems.12030