منابع مشابه
All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
Westudy independent private-value all-pay auctionswith risk-averse players. We show that: (1) Players with low values bid lower and players with high values bid higher than they would bid in the risk neutral case. (2) Players with low values bid lower and players with high values bid higher than they would bid in a first-price auction. (3) Players’ expected utilities in an all-pay auction are l...
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We consider a class of auctions in which bidders receive (asymmetric) shares of the amount of money raised. Examples include corporate takeovers when potential acquirers have “toeholds” and auctions used to raise money for a public good. We show that the optimal selling mechanism in these cases is a simple “all-pay-all” auction in which all bidders pay a weighted sum of all bids. When bidders r...
متن کاملAll-Pay Auctions with Ties
We study the two-player, complete information all-pay auction in which a tie ensues if neither player outbids the other by more than a given amount. In the event of a tie, each player receives an identical fraction of the winning prize. Thus players engage in two margins of competition: losing versus tying, and tying versus winning. Two pertinent parameters are the margin required for victory a...
متن کاملDynamic All-pay Auctions¤
In wars of attrition, players choose how long they bid, but not how much. In all-pay auctions, players choose how much to bid, but not for how long. We study an all-pay auction where two players can spread their bids over two periods. The ...rst period bid is used to in‡uence payo¤s and beliefs of the opponent. The analysis reveals who is blu¢ng, creating an impression of strength that lures th...
متن کاملLarge auctions with risk-averse bidders
We study private-value auctions with n risk-averse bidders, where n is large. We first use asymptotic analysis techniques to calculate explicit approximations of the equilibriumbids and of the seller’s revenue in any k-price auction (k = 1, 2, . . .). These explicit approximations show that in all large k-price auctions the effect of risk-aversion is O(1/n2) small. Hence, all large k-price auct...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-006-0034-5