All-Pay Auctions with Negative Prize Externalities: Theory and Experimental Evidence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
All-Pay Auctions with Negative Prize Externalities: Theory and Experimental Evidence
The paper characterizes the mixed-strategy equilibria in all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes that depend positively on own effort and negatively on the effort of competitors. Such auctions arise naturally in the context of investment games, lobbying games, and promotion tournaments. We also provide an experimental analysis of a special case which captures the strategic situation of a two-st...
متن کاملAll-Pay Auctions vs. Lotteries as Provisional Fixed-Prize Fundraising Mechanisms: Theory and Evidence∗
We study two provisional fixed-prize mechanisms for funding public goods: an all-pay auction and a lottery. In our setting, the public good is provided only if the participants’ contributions are greater than the fixed-prize value; otherwise contributions are refunded. We prove that in this provisional fixed prize setting, lotteries can outperform all-pay auctions in terms of expected public go...
متن کاملAll-Pay Auctions Versus Lotteries as Provisional Fixed-Prize Fundraising Mechanisms: Theory and Evidence∗
We compare two fixed-prize mechanisms for funding public goods, an all-pay auction and a lottery, where public good provision can only occur if the participants’ contributions equal or exceed the fixed-prize value. We show that the provisional nature of the fixed-prize means that efficiency and endowment conditions must both be satisfied to assure positive public good provision. Our main findin...
متن کاملTheoretical and experimental analysis of auctions with negative externalities
We investigate a private value auction in which a single entranton winning imposes a negative externality on two regularbidders. In an English auction when all bidders are active, regular bidders free ride, exiting before price reaches their values. In a rst-price sealed-bid auction incentives for free riding and aggressive bidding coexist, limiting free riding compared to the English au...
متن کاملAll-pay auctions—an experimental study
This paper reports the results of a repeated all-pay auction game. The auction form used is the simplest possible, complete information, perfect recall and common value. Our main findings are that in such an auction, over-bidding is quite drastic, and the seller’s revenue depends strongly on the number of bidders in early stages. However, after a few rounds of play, this dependence completely d...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1291085